Books, blog and other blather

Category: Europe (Page 1 of 2)

So, it looks like Trump was right…

brexit

What a crazy year we are having. In the wake of the British vote to leave the EU (“Brexit”), it is increasingly becoming clear to me just how very right Donald Trump is…

No, not right about policy. Or economics. Or anything that involves thinking.

But one thing he appears to be absolutely right about is why and how people make decisions. As we learned from the playbook for selling the intellectual snake oil that was Trump University:

“You don’t sell products, benefits or solutions — you sell feelings.”

Bingo. Which is why facts are so useless in dealing with the Trumps of the world. Or the Brexits. Or the Catalonian independence types, or the Quebecois separatists, etc. etc.

Another highlight in this section is about selling by approaching people’s “problems”:

  • Customers don’t have need—they have problems.
  • A lot of sales training and books tell you about the importance of selling to customer needs. Although this is basically true, customers don’t sit down and think, “I’ve got a need.” Instead, they experience problems and seek solutions to them.
  • The customer has to perceive the problem, of course. You may perceive the problem, but if the customer doesn’t, then there’s no way they can bite the solution line.
  • So the sales job is about finding, eliciting and solving these problems.

So, instead of finding needs and providing solutions, Trump (and his ilk) find problems and provide feelings. Strength for the weak. Security for the frightened. Clarity for the confused. It’s a pretty potent pitch, especially compared to co-called technocrats, talking about money and data and empty little facts.

Personally, I don’t view the Brexit vote as the end of the world. Markets have roiled mostly because no one thought this would actually happen, and markets don’t like to be surprised. But how this all shakes out politically, I have no idea.

Brexit1

As someone who has a UK passport, I’ll be sad if that becomes a lesser document. I like the idea of trying to bring the world and people together. I hope the UK politicians figure out how to fix things before it’s too late.

But the powers-that-be having been mucking things up around much of the world for far too long. Promising benefits that never come, or demanding sacrifices that don’t actually help. Only when politicians and others begin to recognize people’s real problems and feelings, and present their ideas for the future in those terms, are we going to see things get better.

Spain’s Economy: Two Malos Don’t Make a Bueno (and 3 is right out)

Another weekend, another round of protests here in Spain by the indignados, or “the outraged”, demanding an end to cuts and other austerity measures. I was taking a walk along the Gran Via yesterday when one troupe of demonstrators from Badalona came marching down the road, blocking traffic and shouting their uncoordinated, mismatched chants (for someone used to Korean demonstrations, Spanish protests are rather underwhelming).

But protest quality aside, what is most irksome is seeing how profoundly all involved in Spain — the pro-austerity crowd and the indignados — continue to miss the point.

On the one hand, cutting and slashing budgets in Spain (and much of Europe) are terribly bad macroeconomics. This budget was in surplus with a very small debt when the economic crisis happened, and austerity now in such a miserable economy only creates more problems than it is supposed to cure.

On the other hand, so much of Spain is still so horribly inefficient. Businesses have 20 people doing the work of four or five in, say, New York. One cultural organization I know here in Barcelona has 18 people employed in its tourism division — despite not offering any tours of its facilities or doing anything tourism-related. It’s crazy. The good years of 1996-2006 or so  led to massive bureaucratic expansion, much of which is still in place.

So what solutions are politicians talking about? Instead of trying to figure out how to make the reforms that are needed to make Spain more efficient while creating projects that will help Spain in the long-term, we get arguments about Catalan independence. Instead of cutting the fat and adding to the efficient, we have institutions cutting the meat and protecting the fat.

People aren’t dumb, and as the Spanish political system proves itself to be thoroughly useless in solving the country’s problems, Spaniards are rapidly losing faith in the political system:

So we will very soon be in a situation in which the four main parties in Spain—the ones represented in the Metroscopia survey—all have around or less than 20% support, within a political and constitutional system that is rotting away all by itself due to so much corruption, incapable of bringing about the institutional changes necessary to adapt Spain to a new century, and in which there is no realistic alternative anywhere on the horizon capable of governing the country.

Of course, with the European economy as a whole shrinking for six quarters in a row — worse than the initial crisis of 2008/9 — it’s not like the rest of the continent is doing much better. It’s a beautiful place, but I’m happy I’ll be moving on soon.

Can’t Win for Losing — Econ Edition

Paul Krugman’s latest column, “The 1 Percent Solution,” is a very good one, as usual, but it also gets at a deeper issue that has been bothering me for some time — why is it that austerity ideas are so deeply rooted in the elites, despite such a lack of evidence for their effectiveness? Krugman gets into the class aspects of the divide, arguing that the 1% are simply arguing for policies that are good for the 1%. Not terribly surprising, I guess.

But it is an argument that brings up a couple of related points, imho. The first is demographic. While there is a big divide between haves and have-nots, it is a line that changes with age — as people get older, they tend to get richer, and they tend to become net creditors instead of debtors. The 1% beliefs are not just about entitlements and austerity, they also are very creditor-friendly, preferring deflation over inflation, for example. Which in part explains the difference in how age groups support different policies.

The other bigger issue that I’ve heard economists bring up is the Cold War. Basically, the argument is, back in the days of the Cold War, when there was this big, left-wing enemy out there, the monied elites in the West saw it was in their interest not to let inequality grow too much. The peasants had alternatives, so you couldn’t let them get fired up and storm the Bastille. A stable, happy system was good for all.

But today, now that communism is over as a viable danger, the 1% (or 0.1% or so) are free to push for their own interests without fear of blowback. And so they have pushed, quite successfully. Is it a coincidence that the rise of the financial industry and inequality matches with the downfall of communism? Maybe economic systems need common enemies to keep them in balance.

With the continued problems gripping Europe, you can see people growing more desperate for a solution. Most people are pretty centrist politically, but when the center refuses to provide answers, people will look for alternatives. Certainly Spain is exhibit A for a political system that is completely unable to reform itself or provide answers for its citizens. Without things in Europe getting better, I worry who might try filling that void in the future.

Stuck in the Euro With You

So, apparently the latest round of Euro-crisis wackamole has moved on to Portugal, with worse-then-expected economic news leading to worse-than-expected cuts. Slash, rinse, repeat. As usual, economists like Paul Krugman are saying how foolish the whole austerity cycle is, and as usual no one in authority listens to them (although the Portuguese courts struck down some of the government’s cuts last Friday).

Now, at this point I do not find it very surprising that the political leader in Portugal, as pretty much everywhere in Europe do not have the imagination or the stones to take a stand against the voodoo-economics of cut-cut-cut. But what does surprise me greatly is how little popular support there is for fixing the Europea’s true problem — no, not excessive spending or the welfare state, I’m talking about ending the euro itself.

Living on the Iberian peninsula and traveling around Europe, you see plenty of signs that people are opposed to their governments’ austerity plans. There are oodles of rallies and posters decrying cuts, calling for “socialisme” and “reform”, demanding strikes, etc. But all of that misses the point, doesn’t it? Because when economists say austerity is stupid, they are not advocating continuing spending as if nothing was wrong. The real argument is that the euro itself is fundamentally flawed, and unless Europe turns its currency union into a fuller fiscal union, the euro simply cannot work.

It is a clear and powerful argument. However, I have seen almost no popular pressure to ditch the euro. It isn’t a chant at rallies or a common poster. No political parties of note are rallying behind the idea. And without a commitment to fix the real problem that is plaguing Europe, I don’t see how this problem is going to get fixed … at least not any time soon.

Traveling, Then and Now

Over at Ta-Nehsi Coates’ blog, he has been writing about his travels to Europe, where he is studying French. In some ways, his posts are very typical of the first-time international traveler — confusion, loneliness, reactions to weird differences, self-reflection on one’s weird reactions to differences. But in other ways — Coates being an adult from West Baltimore — his posts are very different and fascinating.

At one point, Coates says:

I am an American and an Anglophone. With that tile I could, at any moment, make myself understood here. It takes a particular kind of tyranny to demand access to everyone’s power, to everyone’s family reunion.

Which I found a rather interesting take on the unilingual, Anglo-American mindset. Although the more I’ve traveled, the more I have seen it exhibited by other cultures, too — by the Chinese, Spanish, Russians, Koreans, Germans, and even the French.

I first traveled to the United States when I was 18, and that was odd enough. But that was still the same language, food, and TV shows, for the most part. My first trip to France occurred when I was around 23 (and still very much an immature dork), and I probably had many of the same reactions Coates had to Paris. You get amazed by all the cool stuff, you walk around to the parks and museums, you wish your French was better, you get hit by bouts of profound loneliness, you are constantly overwhelmed by the experience.

By the time I was 25, I finally made it to Korea, where I got to experience the new-traveler sensations all over again. But it was also different. Korea was a lot different than France or anywhere in western Europe. But it was not my first time traveling anymore, so I had grown a little more comfortable at being uncomfortable (a very important part of becoming a grown-up, imho).

My first week in Korea felt like a year, at least. It was like this vast information dump was hitting my brain, so all the neurons were firing, slowing down time in the process. The first month felt nearly as long again, as I slowly began to figure out this totally different country. And the whole first year, it was much the same process. About six months in, I met someone who had been living in Korea for four years, and he might as well have said he had been living under a polar ice cap — I just could not imagine it. (Granted, this was a smaller city in Korea, not Seoul, and this guy lived outside that town in the countryside … and it was the mid-1990s).

By the second year in Korea, I had settled in and was normalizing my life there, and my two-year anniversary came and went without my even realizing it for a couple of weeks. Next thing you know, you’ve been there a decade.

Even as I was living in Korea, I made a point of traveling as much as I could, going to China, Mongolia, Japan, and many of the other typical places one travels. With each trip, I could feel the sense of overwhelming ease off. I mean, it is still a bit disorienting going to a new place for the first time, but you get used to it. You get more comfortable at being uncomfortable.

Now, many years later, I find myself back in Europe. Things go wrong, communication breaks down, and I try not to let it bother me. I try to enjoy the good stuff and take the hiccups in stride. Of course, I am not traveling by myself anymore, which makes a big difference, too. In my 20s and early 30s, I always traveled alone, which can be more alienating and strange, but it also exposes the neurons to the full force of a new locale and new people. Traveling with a spouse is better, but you always feel a bit more distant from the places you visit … like you are taking a small, two-person country with you at all times. Instead of the tyranny of demanding access to everyone else’s family reunions, you are a family of your own, and now you man the gates and keep out interlopers.

We’ll be heading back to Asia soon — to Southeast Asia instead of Korea — and I’m looking forward to the whole experience all over again. I’m sure there will be some more hiccups, but nothing too bad. I doubt we’ll be feeling overwhelmed by the culture shock or food or anything like that again. I’m pretty comfortable at being uncomfortable. But sometimes I wish I wasn’t.

Europe’s Long, Slow Suicide, Part XCVII

So, Germany and the IMF are now openly talking about letting Greece default and kicking it out of the euro (even though there is no mechanism in place for removing a country from the euro and no one really knows what a default will do to the region).

And, with Spain’s 10-year bond rates climbing to nearly 7.5% this morning, clearly investors don’t believe that the latest bailout plan for Spain is going to work. Just as clearly, Mariano Rajoy has no clue what is going on or how to deal with the crisis. Spain’s whole approach seems to be: delay, deny, do nothing, and wait for things to get so bad that the Germans force you to do whatever; then, you can tell your citizens that it is not your fault all these bad things are happening, the Germans are making you do them. Good times.

As it happens, I’ve been having fun reading some old economics stuff lately — kind of like the angst a teenager gets from reading Romantic poetry, but for middled-aged people — and the big thing I have noticed is how familiar all this feels. Yet again, the political, the clueless, and the spiteful is trumping the economically sound. As JM Keynes said soon after the peace of WWI:

[…] the fundamental economic problems of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four. Reparation was their main excursion into the economic field, and they settled it as a problem of theology, of politics, of electoral chicane, from every point of view except that of the economic future of the States whose destiny they were handling.

– Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace

UPDATE: Of course, Paul Krugman weighs in on Germany’s threat to let Greece leave the euro and makes some good points:

Once a country, any country, has demonstrated that the euro isn’t necessarily forever, investors — and ordinary bank depositors — in other countries are bound to take note. I’d be shocked if Greek exit isn’t followed by large bank withdrawals all around the European periphery.

And, just to hammer the point home:

My advice here is to be afraid, be very afraid.

 

Money, Big Ideas, and Civilization: A Reading List

It looks like I am going to be horribly slow in finishing my review of Doomsday Book. Sorry about that. But at the moment I am putting much of my free time into plowing through a rather large reading list for a seminar I will be attending in a couple of weeks (in the Italian countryside … nice!). The event is being organized by the Legatum Institute, a public policy institute that is perhaps best-known for its Prosperity Index. It also co-sponsored the Democracy Lab with Foreign Policy magazine.

The theme of this event is “Why Do Civilizations Flourish and Fail?”, and I’m sure we’ll have no problem coming up with a definitive answer by the end of the week. -..-

Anyhow, the reading list is a pretty good overview of the latest books on the subject, as well as some pretty tangentially related other books on naval history, neural theories, and more. I thought I would talk a bit about the books, if only to help me work out my own thoughts.

Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty 
-Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson

This book has gotten a lot of press over the last few months, and I suppose it is easy to understand — they have a very clear thesis (“inclusive” political institutions make societies grow, “extractive” ones make them die). I’m kind of surprised that Acemoglu and Robinson are university professors because at many times the book reads a lot like something by a journalist, with random anecdotes and man-on-the-street quotes that are supposed to illustrate a point, but are usually too idiosyncratic to be useful.

While the contrast between inclusive and extractive political institutions is a very interesting and useful point, Acemoglu and Robinson definitely over-rely on it, constantly reducing complex issues and historical changes to a simple inclusive/extractive binary. It’s kind of like the old saying, “When all you have is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail.” And the authors do like to bash away. Jared Diamond has written an excellent analysis of their book over at the New York Review of Books, especially challenging their challenges to his own theories from Guns, Germs, and Steel. He brings far more insight into the longue durée and prehistory arguments than I can, so please check out his review.

But they do have one chapter that revolves around the difference between North and South Korea, which is something I think I know a bit more about. The authors use the Koreas as an example of how different political institutions can radically affect development.But clearly they don’t know a whole lot about Korea, aside from the usual talking points one gets from newspaper stories and introductory books. For example, they talk about South Korea’s property rights, even though, while much stronger than the North, Park Chung Hee did not have a problem walking all over property rights of individuals or corporations when it suited his interests. Nor do they have any concept of how both Koreas’ long history of state administration affects legitimacy or government efficacy. They also talk as if North Korea immediately started to fall apart because of its extractive institutions, overlooking how long North Korea seemed to be doing okay after the division of the Peninsula. North Korea was probably ahead of the South until the mid-late 1970s, and it wasn’t too terribly far behind in the 1980s — granted, that was mostly because it was being propped up by the Soviets, but, still, it was far from the mess that it is today.

Besides, anything involving North Korea really is a bit of a gimme. It’s just too much of a basketcase to be very useful for much practical analysis. You could point to any difference between the countries (professional management, say) and credit/blame it for the differences.

Another huge problem with the book is, even though it a huge emphasis into analyzing why the modern state grew out of England in the 18th century, it barely considers the Scientific Revolution. Lots of talk about the English Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, but science gets a pass. That sort of oversight drives me nuts. Plenty of countries have political revolutions (sometimes widening political power, sometimes centralizing) and several countries have had economic progress, there’s only been one Scientific Revolution. One of the most important results of modern science is the mechanistic, atomistic mindset it created, the ability to think of the world as spiritless, material matter — surely a key stage in creating modern political and economic institutions.

 

Grand Pursuit: The Story of Economic Genius 
-Sylvia Nasar

Nasar is most famously  for her book on mathematician John Nash that led to the movie A Beautiful Mind. Grand Pursuit is mostly a series of small biographies of some of the most important economists of the last two centuries, including Charles Dickens, Marx and Engels, Alfred Marshall, Joseph Schumpeter, Keynes, Hayek, and Samuelson. Not a lot of bit theorizing going on here (and when Nasar does venture into big ideas, it can come across as a bit clunky and forced), but the biographies are compelling and well written.

In a way, it is a bit like my own book, focusing on individuals to look at larger trends and ideas, but of course it is much stronger and broader than Pop Goes Korea. Nasar also fills her stories with the kind of personal details that, while engaging, really make me nervous as a journalist. Things like: “So-and-so looked out the window, more nervous than he had ever felt” (not an exact example, but it gives you a sense) — Do we really know so-and-so was looking out the window then? Do we really know how nervous he was? Maybe Nasar was able to dig up sources that really were that detailed, but for people that long deceased, the style makes me nervous.

Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World
-Vali Nasr

This has probably been my favorite book so far — well written and full of new information and smart insights. It helps that Nasr is from Iran and has a wide network of family, friends, and personal memories to draw from. He’s not just some academic studying a region, but he has a personal stake in the issues and an authentic, street-level view of what is going on.

Not surprisingly, he concentrates heavily on Iran (maybe about half?), and then Pakistan and Turkey get some decent coverage. The rest of the Arab world is discussed, but less in-depth.

If you have watched any Iranian cinema, read Persepolis (the comic book) or other books,  or had any dealings with Iranians, you should already know that much of the country is very different than how it is typically portrayed in the media or thought of by most people. It is far more modern and capitalist than most people in the West realize.

At its heart Nasr’s book is the anti-Why Nations Fail. Whereas Nations‘ authors believe that political institutions come first and all else follows, Nasr believes that economics come first, and political institutions tend to react to the material status of a country. He certainly does not consider Islam to be inherently conservative or medieval. Instead, he thinks that people there are not that much different than God-fearing Americans, only their history has forced them into very different circumstances. He mostly blames a century or so of colonialism and then the oppressive Kemalist governments that ruled much of the region (secular, militarist, and authoritarian) for destroying the middle class, ruining basic governing structures, and giving rise to Islamism.

 

The Ascent of Money  
-Niall Ferguson

I’m not finished it yet, but, on the whole, Fergunson’s book is a lot stronger than I thought it would be — much less political, like his often blustery newspaper editorials, and more solid, fact-based history. Of course Ferguson is arguing a particular point of economic view, but it does not overwhelm the subject matter.

Unsurprisingly, Ferguson’s chapter on the Rothchilds is one of the strongest (as his history of the family is considered one of the best out there). But rather than concentrate too much on personalities, Ferguson looks more at the institutions and larger aspects of money: money as credit, money as bonds, insurance, etc. His look at the financial background of World War I — how the markets did not see war coming and, only at last moments before the scope of the coming conflict was clear, completely freaked out, with all the major stock exchanges in the world shutting down within a few days — is particularly fascinating.

But when we move from history and closer to contemporary issues (and therefore contemporary politics), Ferguson’s book weakens. He is entirely too credulous about the rise of China, for example. And blaming (crediting?) China for the hedge fund and derivative explosion of the last 15 years is just bizarre — kind of like blaming TNT for an explosion, rather than the person who set and detonated the bomb. It reminds of me that Simpsons episode, “Kamp Krusty,” when Bart asks Krusty how he could lend his name to such a lousy product. Krusty answers:

“They drove a dump truck full of money up to my house! I’m not made of stone!”

You can see the episode with that quote here (around 3:50).

Ferguson’s big conclusion, about how banking and finance need more evolutionary pressure and creative destruction is a bit dubious, too. After all, even Alan Greenspan had admitted that the banks’ instincts for self-preservation are not nearly as good as he once believed.

Debt: The First 5,000 Years  
-David Graeber
Not really on the reading list, but it seemed like a good addition. Sadly, this is not the book I was hoping for, which would have been a history of debt. Instead, it is more of a grand re-theorizing of all of modern economics from an anthropological point of view — and a very political, academic-left kind of post-modern anthropology at that (i.e.: not the good kind of anthro). Apparently Graeber is some kind of famous anarchist activist, so I guess it was my fault for thinking this book might be something different than what it is.

That said, it is definitely a book with merits. Sure, it may drive you crazy two or three times a page, but Graeber also will intrigue and stimulate three or four times on that same page, so generally you come out ahead. However, unless you are inclined to believe that the last 5,000 years are all an unnecessary social construct built upon cruelty and domination, and we could transform our world into a truly free, open place by getting rid of money, then this book is probably not for you.

 

Lords of the Sea: The Epic Story of the Athenian Navy
and the Birth of Democracy

-John Hale

Hale’s book is another total winner. Fun and endlessly insightful. He ties the cultural/political flowering of Athens into its rise as a naval power in the eastern Mediterranean. In the face of conflicts with the Spartans and the Persians, Themistocles convinces Athens to build a powerful navy of trireme vessels — oar-powered ships that could ram their way through other boats. But oars require people to power them, and the sheer number of ships in the Athenian fleet meant that pretty much all of Athens’ citizens had to spend some time at sea; and because everyone is equal when rowing and everyone rowed, Hale argues that the triremes played an important part in developing the city’s democratic, participatory character.

 

The World America Made
-Robert Kagan

I basically agree with Ian Buruma on this book — the US global military presence is general does more harm than good. Not because the United States is evil (generally its foreign policy seems well-intentioned), but because the US’s protection encourages many countries not to develop their own defense forces adequately. And when countries do not take responsibility for their own defense, that turns them into irresponsible children.

I did, however, like the reminder that the United States never really was that dominant internationally, even after World War II, and enemies and allies alike constantly jostled for power and influence around the world.

* * *

Iain McGilchrist’s The Master and His Emissary is also on the reading list (and I downloaded it to my Kindle), but at this point I am more familiar with McGilchrist’s TED talk than his book. I hope to fix that situation soon, though. As a big Julian Jaynes nerd, it does look like McGilchrist’s work is in a similar vein.

 

There have also been some classics on the reading list, so it has been fun revisiting Macchiavelli’s The Prince, Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, and Farid ud-Din Attar’s The Conference of the Birds (not on the reading list, but Nasr’s book on Iran put me into a Persian sort of mood)

United States of Europe or Bust

Edward Hugh has another great article on the state of the euro, the Spanish economy, and what the future might hold for the region. Key graph:

Whatever way you call the aid Spain is now receiving from Europe it is clear that this is the beginning and not the end of what is likely to be a long process, one which will now inexorably lead to either the creation of a United States of the Euro Area, or to failure and disintegration of the Euro. There will be no middle path, so the stakes are now very high for all involved. Unfortunately Europe’s leaders are still too busy thinking short term, and practicing one step at a time-ism.

Housing prices, after putting up a fight for a while, are really in freefall now, plunging 13% last year alone — that’s the fastest rate since the economic crisis began five years ago. And since the housing bubble is the key part of the crisis in Spain, the plunge in prices (down 30% from the peak and no bottom in sight) means at last real decisions will have to be made.

It’s still amazing to me, though, how little has changed in daily life for most people here, despite the massive amounts of pain the economy is going through.

Soros on the Euro

George Soros has published a very good presentation on the state of the euro and what went wrong here. It is a bit dense in parts, but totally worth a read.

Like many analysts (at least the ones I like), he notes that the euro crisis is not a fiscal crisis as much as it is a problem with banks and balances of payments. But he adds a unique wrinkle I had not heard before, calling the euro crisis a political bubble, not a financial one.

The authorities did not even understand the nature of the problem, let alone see a solution. So they tried to buy time.

Usually that works. Financial panics subside and the authorities realize a profit on their intervention. But not this time because the financial problems were reinforced by a process of political disintegration. While the European Union was being created, the leadership was in the forefront of further integration; but after the outbreak of the financial crisis the authorities became wedded to preserving the status quo. This has forced all those who consider the status quo unsustainable or intolerable into an anti-European posture. That is the political dynamic that makes the disintegration of the European Union just as self-reinforcing as its creation has been. That is the political bubble I was talking about.

(Emphasis mine.)

Having read the whole Game of Thrones series recently, I cannot help but think of Rob Stark, who won every battle but could not win the war (not really a spoiler, since that is kind of the theme of the books). The economists really have won battles, showing that the euro as constructed was a bad idea, then once the euro crisis began, describing how serious it was and what was needed to stop it. But despite having the winning arguments, time and time again the politicians win the day with one half-baked agenda or another. There just is not the political will to do what needs to be done, in the United States, China, and especially in Europe.

Which, by the way, makes me ever more impressed with how Korea handled the Asian economic crisis of 1997-8. Korean families donating their gold to fight the crisis might not have been useful in any direct sense, but it did show a certain unity of spirit, enabling Korea’s politicians to do what needed to be done. Considering how divisive Korean politics usually is, it is amazing how much political will that country can generate when it needs to.

Anyhow, where does Soros think all this is going?

In my judgment the authorities have a three months’ window during which they could still correct their mistakes and reverse the current trends. By the authorities I mean mainly the German government and the Bundesbank because in a crisis the creditors are in the driver’s seat and nothing can be done without German support.

He think Europe needs to fix the immediate problems, to give itself some breathing space and pass new legislation/treaties required to fix the euro. But there is just three months to get things done, and so far there is no political will in Germany at all.

UPDATE: Right on cue, here’s Edward Hugh with a big dose of sunshine. And by “sunshine,” of course I mean incredibly depressing facts. “Global Growth Shutters Toward a Halt” at Fistful of Euros.

Spain Economy Meltdown (Just the Previews for Now)

Always great to see Paul Krugman turning his eye to Spain, even if it is because the Euro crisis is spreading its way over here. As he succinctly says, Spain is no case of meltdown by excess spending: it was running a surplus in 2007 and its debt level was very low. What Spain did have, however, was a housing bubble–created in no small part by way too much cheap money from Germany.

I’m still amazed at how the PIGS countries are putting up with German-led nonsense about how to solve this crisis. Foolish Northern lending was as responsible for Europe’s current woes as anything, so it is not unreasonable to ask those responsible to bear a share of the pain of fixing the problem.

There is that old saying: If you owe the bank $1,000, the bank owns you; but if you owe the bank $1 million,  you own the bank. If I were Spain–and Portugal, and perhaps Italy (but not Greece: they really are messed up with excessive spending–I would be pushing back. Sure, Spain pulling out of the euro would create havoc here, but it was be just as bad for the rest of Europe. The threat would go a long way to righting the balance between Europe’s north and south.

For more information about the Spanish economy, there is always the wonderful Edward Hugh. He has a new interview up here. I wonder what Mr. Hugh would make of Krugman’s suggestion that Germany should raise its inflation rate up to 4% or so, while the PIGS are kept at 1%-ish, to help re-balance the north and south of Europe.

« Older posts

© 2024 Mark James Russell

Theme by Anders NorenUp ↑